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In both economics and politics, parallel trends have been observed in 
contemporary Europe, towards Europeanization and regionalization. After a 
period in which European integration and regional assertion were seen as 
somehow contradictory, they are increasingly seen as complementary, serving to 
restructure economic and political space and create new systems of action. 
Similarly, economic restructuring and political change are, in a new version of 
functionalist theory, often seen as causally connected not, this time, at the level of 
Europe or of the nation state, but at that of the region. I argue in this paper that 
these processes are indeed connected, but not in a deterministic or teleological 
manner. There is an autonomous role for politics and ideology in mediating the 
relationship between economic and political change, and between European 
integration and regional assertion. This creates distinct patterns of territorial 
restructuring in different places and gives rise to distinct development projects 
within the European and global market. The "new regionalism", unlike previous 
forms of territorial politics, is shaped not merely by the state but by the 
international economic context and the emerging international and continental 
regimes. Over-generalized explanations, and under-operationalized concepts 
proliferate, which do not help us to understand this complexity and variation and 
can distract attention from issues of power and distribution formerly central to the 
concerns of students of politics. In the absence of general theory, we need more 
comparative analysis; and we need to make explicit the normative bias of much of 
the analysis. We do not yet know enough about the emergence of regions as 
territorial systems of action. Explanations tend to be divided between those that 
focus exclusively on present-day factors such as global economic change or 
European integration, and historically reductionist accounts, wedded to path 
dependency. What is needed is an approach that takes account both of the 
existence of historical materials rooted in culture and social practices, and of the 
adaptation of these in contemporary circumstances. Regions, like Europe and like 





















































































































































































Much has been written on the crisis of the state and the end of sovereignty 
(Camilleri and Falk, 1992). It would be a mistake to exaggerate the decline of the 
European state, since it retains a formidable arsenal of powers and resources. It is 
also important to avoid falling into the analytical trap of contrasting a mythical 
past state, all-powerful, monopolistic and sovereign, with a modem state which is 
weakened, pluralist and forced to share its powers with supranational, subnational 
and private sector agencies. These tendencies have always been present, to a 
greater or lesser extent within individual states. Nonetheless, there has been an 
important transformation in the state and a disarticulation of the various spheres 
of social, economic and political action which it formerly encompassed. There is 
a gap between the system of representation, through state institutions, and 
decision-making, which has retreated into territorial and social networks. 
Consequently, the divorce between politics and policy is growing. This 
disorganization of political space and the lack of theoretical instruments to 
analyse it is a problem for the understanding of national societies, which at least 
still have sovereign governments. At the European and regional levels, which are 
more complex and often weakly institutionalized and less organized, matters are 
even worse. European integration and regionalism are creating new political and 
economic spaces whose structure and dynamic are still unclear.
The European political space is, compared with national states, rather 
unstructured, pluralist and weakly organized by interests. On the economic side, 
the internal market is similarly rather deregulated and, with a few obvious 
exceptions such as agriculture, weakly organized. In some ways, this 
depoliticized domain provides poor terrain for social movements and new forms 
of collective and political action, since there are few opportunities to aggregate 
sectoral demands or challenge inbuilt assumptions. Yet the weakening of the state 
framework of economic management does impose new demands on substate 
actors and provide new incentives to change their way of working, while Europe 
and also provides a space in which these can operate. Regions have emerged as 
operators within this space, to the degree to which they have been able to 
structure themselves as systems of action and as actors, but they are still groping 
for the means of action and effectiveness.
Regionalism also has both economic and political dimensions, which are 
creating new forms of space distinct from that of the nation state. Economic 
restructuring follows two complementary logics, global and local. It is guided by 
factors like the investment decisions of multinational corporations and 
international capital flows; but the impact of these is mediated by local factors 
and even global effects are felt as local ones. Globalization creates a tension 
between the aspatial rationality of the transnational corporation, with its multiple 
branches and ability to move investment around, and the spatially-bound



























































































rationality of communities which depend on these investments (Keating, 1992). 
So firms escape territorial influences, while territories become more dependent on 
firms. Given global constraints, states are no longer able to manage their spatial 
economies by diversionary regional policies or strategic placing of public 
investments. Yet at the same time, it is increasingly recognized that economic 
development and the insertion of territories into the global economy depend on 
specific characteristics of territories (Amin and Thrift, 1994). So modem 
development policies put more emphasis on indigenous growth, or the attraction 
of investment by qualities linked to the region like the environment, the quality of 
life, or a trained labour force, rather than on investment incentives provided by 
the central state (Stohr, 1990; Gore, 1984). Scholars have rediscovered the 
classic notion of the industrial-district, characterized by networks of territorial 
interdependence (Dunford and Kafkalas, 1992; Morgan, 1992; Storper, 1995). 
Development itself is defined more broadly, to include quality of life issues. The 
new development paradigm gives an important role to the construction of 
identities, of territorially-based systems of action, and territorial solidarities. 
These new regional systems of action are now placed more directly in 
confrontation with the international market (Courchene, 1995) because the 
intermediary role of the state has been severely attenuated.
Many questions remain about the nature of these networks and the values 
they embody. While some observers wax enthusiastic about the 'third Italy' with 
its dense networks of small firms (Nanetti, 1988) others who have observed the 
phenomenon more closely see a more differentiated picture (Ritaine, 1989) or 
note the widespread exploitation which the productive process encourages and 
which local social norms legitimize (Amin and Thrift, 1994). In a manner 
reminiscent of 1960s Marxists, devotees of the model have subsequently 
wandered over Europe searching for the productivist utopia - candidates have 
included Baden-Württemberg, various places in Scandinavia and the Basque 
Country.
On the political side, trends to regionalism come both from the top-down 
and the bottom-up. Top-down regionalism often represents a response to state 
political and administrative overload, a search for rationalization in public 
administration, or the "decentralization of penury" by forcing the social cost of 
economic restructuring down to a lower level. Bottom-up regionalism stems from 
pressures from below, although these can cover a wide range of issues (Keating, 
1996a,b). Strategically, regionalism can aim in several directions. There is an 
integrative regionalism, seeking to insert the territory more fully into the national 
political and economic system; an autonomist regionalism, seeking a distinct path 
of development; and minority nationalism, with a historic and cultural basis, 




























































































(Keating, 1996b)1. The social and political basis of regionalist and nationalist 
movements is also diverse, from the middle class populism of the Lega Nord 
(Biorcio, 1991), to the social democracy of the Scottish National Party, through 
the middle class Christian democracy of Convergencia i Unio, to the "bourgeois 
regionalism" of the prosperous and competitive German Lander, or the Flemish 
Christian Democrats.
It is tempting to try and wrap all these phenomena up in a single 
explanatory framework, focused on the crisis of the state. In an unconscious echo 
of functionalist and neo-functionalist writing, many observers have extrapolated 
from the emergence of new economic regions to the restructuring of political 
space. Ohmae (1995) presents a world of "regional states" defined by trading 
relationships and production systems, competing with each other in a rigorously 
neo-liberal global order in which the old systems of political representation and 
control are dismissed as a tiresome irrelevance. Badie (1995) insists on the "end 
of territory" as a principle of social and political organization, in the face of 
economic change and social individualism, although what he really seems to be 
getting at is the end of the territorial nation-state. What these analyses neglect is 
the autonomous role of politics in translating functional pressures into behaviour 
and action (Pintarits, 1996).
Much of the writing about the new order of politics merely documents this 
reconfiguration of power or, in the absence of general theory, falls back on 
descriptive metaphors or pluralist ideas. The most commonly used notions are 
those of "networks" and of "governance". "Governance" is used in at least six 
different ways (Rhodes, 1996) but generally seems to refer to the emergence of 
self-regulating systems which go beyond government in the traditional sense. 
"Network" is used in some cases merely as a "road map" of actors and 
institutions, in others as a theory of power. Both are useful in drawing attention to 
new configurations of power which transcend institutional boundaries, although 
this is scarcely a new insight. Yet they do not provide much theoretical leverage, 
and their generality, ubiquity and lack of calibration make comparative analysis 
very difficult.2 Merely documenting the movement of power and authority out of 
state institutions invites a complacency about its normative implications. That 
these exist can be seen by looking at the "New Public Management" which, with 
its exaltation of market mechanisms and devaluation of citizenship, shares the 
same vocabulary of governance, networks and (bounded) pluralism.3 The main
1. This is more acurate than describing these movements as separatist, since most o f them 
nowadays are not claiming a state in the classic sense.
2. If governance is everything, then it is not much use as an analytical took. If it is not, then we 
need to know what non-governance is and how they differ.
3. By bounded pluralism, I mean the American concept of pluralism, in which there is 





























































































normative question arises from the disarticulation of the nation-state as a system 
of action, the devaluation of citizenship and the division of the social reality into 
separate spaces for the market, for political representation, and for identity, which 
can have serious effects, not only for governmental efficiency but also for 
democracy and social cohesion. Touraine (1992, a, b) portrays a social world 
divided into a sphere of international competition in which the state is allied with 
business or subordinated to the international market; one of consumption, 
dominated by the individual; and one of defensive identity, threatening racism and 
insularity.
We need to bring back politics into the discussion, then, both for analytical 
purposes and to provide some basis for normative appreciation. Specifically, we 
need an analysis which allows us to address the normative issues at the heart of 
traditional political theory; which enables us to detect the policy bias inherent in 
particular types of governing arrangements; which helps us reveal the social 
construction of new power constellations and governing coalitions; and which 
links external influences with the internal power structures of territorial spaces, 
not privileging one over the other. Globalization and European integration may be 
forces affecting the whole of Europe, but their impact on different societies 
depends on the constitution of those societies. Where there is a historic territorial 
fault-fine within a state (as in Spain, the UK or Belgium), global and continental 
forces may serve to widen it, weakening the ability of the state to manage 
territorial diversity. In other cases, such as France, the response may be 
centripetal, as affected groups look to the state for redress.4 The re-emergence of 
regions in the new Europe is thus the result both of functional restructuring, and 
of a process of region-building on the ground.
A political analysis of the phenomenon of regions must recognize distinct 
dimensions of the phenomenon. Regions are spaces, defined in many ways: by 
territory; by economic function; by culture; by felt identity; by administrative 
division. They may be political arenas (Keating, 1996b). They may constitute 
systems of action (Balme, 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996); and they may become 
actors in wider political arenas. It is the coincidence of these various meanings in 
space which together define a region and give it more or less coherence (Keating, 
1996b). Regions are political arenas to the degree to which there is a political 
space, within which there are local issues, or global issues are perceived through 
their local impact, a public debate on these regional issues, and an acceptance of 
the region as a legitimate space for taking decisions. The constitution of such 
spaces depends on systems of interest articulation, a sense of identity, media, and
The new public management lends itself well to the politics o f a Bill Clinton or Tony Blair, for 
whom there are no big issues, no serious social cleavages and no great battles to be won.
4. Of course, there are non-territorial responses to the crisis o f representative government, 




























































































public institutions.5 As systems of action, they are constituted of social forces, 
institutions and power relationships. Regions become actors to the degree to 
which they are able to formulate a regional interest and project this in national, 
continental and global arenas, in state institutions and in the market. Much of the 
contemporary writing on regionalism elides these different meanings and simply 
assumes that regions are actors; or else, as noted above, adopts a functionalist 
approach, reading off the interests of regions and their emergence as actors from 
the requirements of global economic restructuring.
The Competitive Imperative
There is a connection between economic restructuring and the political response; 
between the conception of regions as arenas and systems of action, and that of 
them as actors, but the links are complex and varied. The main connection is the 
imperative of inter-regional competition, both as a fact of life, and as an 
ideological construct.
Inter-regional competition for investment, technology and markets, has 
increased as a result of capital mobility within Europe and the world; 
technological change which has reduced the importance of distance in some 
functions, and reduced that of natural resource endowments or proximity to 
waterways in others; and the rise of multinational corporations with global 
investment strategies. The Single European Market has further accentuated 
competition for investment and markets, while the policies of the EU provide a 
focus for political competition, as regions struggle for funding, or seek to bend 
EU policies to their needs. Inter-regional competition is also, however, a matter 
of perception, or at least a new appreciative frame for policy. The new 
development paradigm places great emphasis on the qualities of territories as a 
factor in development and on the external economies of scale and mutual support 
to be gained by the presence in a territory of complementary activities. This has 
led to a new emphasis on the competitiveness of territories in the international 
market, rather than just of sectors or firms. The idea of competitive advantage, in 
which a whole regional society is pitched against others, has thus come to 
displace the traditional notion of comparative advantage, in which regions were 
seen as complementary with each other, each specializing in that sector in which 
it was best. As transmuted into political debate, this has produced a neo- 
mercantilist philosophy, in which regions are pitted against each other in a zero- 
sum game6 for advantage in the global market. This perception, that regions are in 
a war of all against all, is in the interest of big firms and investors, who never
5. This is discussed at greater length in Keating (1996, a.b; 1997).
6. The zero-sum condition is not always made explicit, but is implicit in the very idea of 




























































































cease to'remind regions of the need to adapt to it; and of regional politicians, to 
whom it provides a rallying theme comparable to that which national politicians 
have in the flag.
This inter-regional competition, and the way it is presented, in turn shapes 
the internal politics of regions. This is reminiscent of Lowi’s (1969) paradox, in 
which the policy or policy arena shapes politics, and not the other way around. 
Inter-regional competition can to some degree displace internal political 
competition, as the region, presented as an actor with a unitary interest is pitted 
against its rivals. The political agenda is redefined and narrowed, political 
discourse is reshaped, special legitimacy is accorded those who can successfully 
claim the ability to operate in the new market conditions. Politicians seize on the 
development theme as a slogan which allows them to build new social alliances 
beyond their usual class, or other bases, resorting to slogans such as la région qui 
nous rassemble to project the unitary interest behind their conception of 
development. Yet in reality, development is a complex matter and can have very 
different contents in different places. It cannot simply be reduced to a matter of 
GDP per capita or annual growth rates. There are trade-offs to be made between 
social cohesion and growth; between development and environmental 
considerations. Maintenance and development of distinct cultures may be an 
independent objective, which may or may not coincide with the pursuit of 
competitive growth. Priority can be given to employment creation or to 
productivity and technological advance.7
The balance of objectives in any given case will reflect both the region's 
market position and its internal political construction. Regions in a favourable 
market position will, other things being equal, be able better to control the terms 
of their insertion into the European and global economies. Others may be reduced 
to dependence on international capital and forced into a strategy of competition 
based on low wages and low social overheads. Yet there is also an important 
internal element in the capacity of the region to generate a system of action which 
strikes the balance among objectives, invests in public goods and reconciles the 
varying objectives in a positive-sum manner. Nation states have increasing 
difficulty doing this, and regions cannot simply step into their place. Yet while 
market competition does impact on the politics of regions, its effect is mediated 
by internal political structures in the region and the state.
7. Neo-liberal economists will insist that these objectives are consistent in the long run, just as 
they insist that low inflation is the key to all macro-economic policy objectives, but when 




























































































Regions as systems of action are thus shaped both by the demands of market 
competition and by their own internal social and political structures. A structural 
contingency approach, seeing regions and their policy choices as determined by 
their external market environment (as in Ohmae, 1995) would be as mistaken as 
an approach which looked simply at their internal politics. An approach which 
simply examined institutions or networks, without looking at the policy content of 
these and their social bias, would be equally incomplete. In the absence of a 
grand theory of regionalism, a useful middle-range concept is that of a 
"development coalition" (Keating, 1993, 1997), adapted from the literature on 
urban political restructuring.8 This is a place-based inter-class coalition devoted j 
to economic growth in a specific location. Its composition varies from region to' 
region depending on a number of factors, including territory; institutions; 
leadership; social composition; and culture. This idea connects the notions of the 
region as a political arena, in which policies are contested; a system of action, in 
which decisions are taken whether in the market, the state or civil society; and an 
actor which is capable of projecting a regional interest, defined by the 
development coalition, in the international market, and national and European 
political space.
Territory
The existence of a regional development coalition depends obviously on the 
existence of a region as a territorial space. This is a problematic and contested 
matter. Territory for the purposes of a development effort may be defined 
according to economic or functional criteria, but this may compete with other 
definitions, based on cultural, historical or administrative criteria. A territorial 
development coalition may emerge out of a functionally-defined region but to see 
this as a normal or automatic process would be to fall back into the functionalist 
trap. Development coalitions can just as easily form on the basis of cultural 
regions, as in the case of contemporary Wales, where territorial identity has been 
recast from an old reliance on language and historic myths, to a new focus on 
economic development in the European market (Jones, 1997). Elsewhere, the 
existence or the limits of the region may be contested, as in many parts of France, 
or England. They may be rival projects, often pitting actors focused on a large 
city against those seeking to establish a regional system of action, as in the 
competition between the city of Barcelona and the Generalitat of Catalonia 
(Morata, 1996).
The Construction of Regions
8. The differences between this and the "growth machine" (Logan and Molotch, 1987) are that 
my formulation emphasizes the interdependence o f internal politics and the external 
environment; and I regard the composition of the coalition and its policy bias as variable 
(Keating, 1993). Le Gales, (1996) uses the term "governance" in a similar way, giving it a 





























































































The existence of a regional government is not essential for a development 
coalition, but it does make a considerable difference. Multi-purpose elected 
regional governments open the development project to a wider set of influences 
and broaden the political agenda. Functionally-defined regional governments, 
without a broader representative role, such as the French regional governments, 
are less likely to do this. In other cases, regional institutions have been structured 
precisely to minimize political and broader social input, restricting the agenda to 
economic development very narrowly defined. In the United Kingdom, 
governments have been forced repeatedly since the mid 1960s to put in place 
regional institutions for powerful functional reasons,9 but have generally resisted 
its politicization. In the 1960s, their preference was for state-led technocratic 
institutions, with a weak form of regional corporatism to accompany them. Since 
the 1980s, the emphasis has been on private-sector led bodies with, in the 1990s, 
a rationalized state regional administration. "Governance" here represents a 
poorly structured space in which those interests with a minimal of organizational 
capacity have a huge advantage over other social interests, with no organizational 
capacity at all (c.f. Stone, 1989). Where regional governments exist, they may be 
more or less directive and centralizing. Among the German Lander, there are 
important differences between North Rhine-Westphalia, which sees regional 
development as a sub-Land matter and pursues a strategy focused on local 
employment markets, and Baden-Wiirttemberg, which takes a more centralist 
line, focused on sectors and research institutes (Sturm, 1997). Some regional 
governments take a direct leading role in development projects, while others seek 
to involve the private sector and social actors more fully. The intergovernmental 
system is also important. French regions' abilities to define their own 
development strategies are constrained by the integrated investment planning 
system represented by the contrats de plan. While these are supposed to provide 
for a dialogue and negotiation between the state and the regions over priorities, 
they often end up making the regions pay for state investments, or tying their own 
investments to state priorities. In some regions, European intervention has opened 
up participation in development projects (Hooghe, 1996) with its requirements for 
partnership and local input. In many of the French regions, by contrast, European 
regional policy has provided new instruments for the DATAR and the regional 
prefects to get back into the development game from which they had been 
progressively excluded as a result of the decline of regional policy spending and 
decentralization.
Leadership
The character and orientation of political leadership is important, especially 
where the regional political elite has a strong role. In many regions, development 
has been adopted as a mobilizing theme by political leaders and used to establish




























































































a political profile. Development can be presented as an issue which cuts across 
social divisions and benefits the entire population.10 With class and other loyalties 
weakening, development is a powerful electoral theme, enabling a politician to 
establish an individual image and promote a new social base, while strengthening 
the idea of the region as the basis of common interest. Economic development has 
been stressed by a number of German and French regional leaders, as well as by 
leaders in Spain and Belgium. Regions like Baden-Württemberg and Rhone- 
Alpes are thus identified with modernity, dynamism and prosperity, an image 
further promoted by their participation in the Four Motors of Europe project. 
Other regional leaders are tied to a distributive or clientelistic pattern of politics. 
It is often thought that clientelism itself is inimical to development, since it 
distorts resource allocation and only survives by stifling self-sustaining 
development which would undermine the basis of the patrons' power. In some 
cases, however, clientelistic and machine systems can serve to mobilize resources 
for development and integrate disparate organizations and policy systems 
(Ritaine, 1994). Piattoni (1997) traces both models of clientelism in two Italian 
regions, showing how the political boss of Abruzzo, given the right incentive 
structure, worked to produce growth. In the west of Scotland, similarly, a Labour 
Party machine, with a centralized structure and traditions of discipline, was able 
to move from the politics of clientelist distribution into the new growth politics in 
the 1980s (Keating, 1988). Similar examples are available from the United States, 
where the Pittsburgh Renaissance of the 1950s was undertaken by a Democratic 
Party machine in alliance with the local business elite (Weber, 1988).
Social Composition
The strategy of the development coalition and the content of policy will be 
affected by the representation of social interests, notably those of capital and 
labour. International and European market integration itself redistributes power 
from labour to capital since capital is more mobile than labour and can play off 
regions against each other. Within regions, the presence of organized class 
interests varies. Some regions, such as many parts of Germany, have retained 
their indigenous bourgeoisies, with a continued social investment in the place. In 
the UK, by contrast, regional bourgeoisies of the old industrial regions often sold 
out, moved to London, or moved socially into the leisured upper classes through 
the purchase of land, from the early part of the twentieth century, and especially 
after the First World War. British capital has also been more internationalized 
than that of other European countries. In both France and Britain, the 
centralization of the financial systems on the capital which in the nineteenth 
century contrasted with the dispersal of industrial ownership and production at 
the periphery, tended in the twentieth century to concentrate industrial ownership 
at the centre too. There is also a powerful cultural effect in Britain and France,
l0. In practice, o f course, it benefits different groups to a different extent and comes with costs 




























































































since the accents, education and cultural values of the centre (Paris in France and 
London-Oxford in the UK) are hegemonic and regional industrialists have 
powerful incentives to assimilate, if not in their own generation, then in their 
children's. In Norway, by contrast, the culture of the capital possesses no 
privileged status, and is not a strong pole of attraction for the middle classes.
The existence of a regional bourgeoisie is not entirely independent of 
politics. The example of Quebec shows that a regional bourgeoisie can be 
fostered by public policies, if the regional government possesses the power and 
resources (Latouche, 1991). In Catalonia, the local bourgeoisie is in retreat in the 
face of multinational capital but the Generalitat gives a lot of attention to the 
small business sector, an important base of support for the governing CiU party. 
Even in Scotland, the Conservative government since the 1980s has been 
attempting to rebuild the local bourgeoisie to counteract the political hegemony of 
the left and the statist orientation of policy since the Second World War (Keating, 
1996). In regions with nationalist movements, business has to accommodate this 
dimension; small business interests are generally more sympathetic than large 
corporations.
Business leaders are always wedded rhetorically to the idea of the free 
market and neo-liberal nostrums, but in practice usually support regional 
development efforts, as long as these are delivered by depoliticized agencies with 
a strong business input. They appreciate the functional rationale for organizing 
government at the regional level to deliver training policies, infrastructure and 
land use planning, but this is in tension with their suspicion of regional 
government as a basis for non-business or anti-business forces, producing an 
ambivalent attitude to territorial politics (Lange, 1997).
Labour has become more territorialized as class struggles have shifted to 
the defence of threatened plants and sectors. Sometimes, it has been able to 
mobilize wider social movements of territorial defence committed to broader 
goals and regional development strategies but these have been rather precarious, 
as the French cases show. Labour and the social democratic parties have become 
increasingly supportive of decentralization and regionalism, as their faith in the 
centralized state has diminished and they have been drawn into territorial-based 
conflicts. In regions with nationalist movements, unions are drawn into nationalist 
politics and may support nationalist movements (as in the Basque Country or 
Quebec) or seek to straddle the issue (as in Catalonia and Scotland). Yet at the 
same time, unions insist on the maintenance of national labour market regulation 
so that they too are ambivalent on the question of regionalism.
The new regionalism has produced many examples of capital-labour co­
operation in pursuit of a common territorial interest. Generally, given its 




























































































junior partner. In France, where union membership is particularly low, they hardly 
feature at all. In the UK, they have been marginalized by the Conservative 
government, not only in national policy making but also in the construction of the 
new instruments for local and regional development, including the Urban 
Development Corporations and Training and Enterprise Councils (Local 
Enterprise Companies in Scotland). There are subtle differences here, though. In 
Scotland and at least during the 1980s, in Wales, the strength of the labour 
movement and the more accommodating style forced on the Secretaries of State 
for Scotland and Wales by their role as territorial managers and defenders of the 
territorial interest, prevented the complete exclusion of trade unions. The Scottish 
Economic Council, on which the trade unions sit, survived the abolition of the 
Regional Economic Planning Councils in England. In Germany, trade unions 
feature more strongly in the Social Democratic stronghold of North Rhine- 
Westphalia than in Baden-Württemberg. In Spain, control of autonomous 
communities by either the socialists or the Christian democrats of the Catalan CiU 
or Basque PNV produces a willingness to recognize trade unions as social 
partners, although, given the low level of unionization in Spain, as very junior 
ones. In France, Italy and Spain, the division of the trade union movement on 
political lines also weakens its influence and allows regional leaders to choose 
their favoured union partners. In France and Italy, both business and unions have 
a weak presence at regional level.
While there is extensive regional collaboration over development issues, 
the conditions are not present for a form of regional corporatism (Streek and 
Schmitter, 1991; Anderson, 1992). Neither side of industry has invested heavily 
enough in the regional level, and regional governments do not provide a 
sufficiently powerful interlocutor. Where there are powerful regional 
governments, in Germany, these have tended to take a rather directive role, with 
the Land government laying down policy rather than negotiating with social 
interests as one would expect to find at the federal level. It is as though the Land 
governments, lacking sovereign authority, and caught in a complex system of 
interdependency with the federal and European levels, are unwilling to 
contemplate any further leakage of power. A similar phenomenon may be 
emerging in Flanders, where the regional government is seeking to centralize 
powers on itself as it consolidates its authority in the new order (De Rynck, 
1996).
Culture
The new development paradigm emphasizes the production of public goods, the 
need for collective action and reciprocity. It requires a means to manage 
externalities and gamer external benefits so as to avoid sub-optimal investment 
decisions. It de-emphasizes the role of large corporations and of the state in 
favour of local and regional self-regulating networks. These rest on norms of 




























































































absence of strong institutions.
Much has been written recently about the importance of "social capital" 
whether at national (Fukayama, 1995) or at regional (Putnam, 1993) level. The 
concept is elusive, seemingly hanging somewhere between the institutional and 
the cultural. Cultural explanations have out of fashion within American political 
science." This is partly in reaction to the abuse of the idea of political culture in 
the 1960s to sustain a kind of western cultural imperialism; partly because culture 
in the past was invoked as a residual explanation when nothing else seemed to 
work; but mainly because cultural explanations appear to violate the rational actor 
assumptions which have come to dominate the discipline. Yet rational actor 
models, while they may show us why everyone would be better off if they did 
observe norms of social reciprocity, do not show us how and why they do so, or 
why this happens in some places and not in others. There needs to be something 
to bridge between individual and collective rationality in a society where 
individuals do not know each other personally and have no individual incentive to 
see further than a generation ahead. This is especially so in the new dispensation 
in which regions face the global market directly, with a reduced protective role 
for the state. In a globalized economy, there may be a premium on social 
solidarity and territorial cohesion, but global integration does not produce these. 
On the contrary, it works against them.
Culture is implicitly present in the new writing on regional development, 
industrial districts and social capital, however well-disguised in the garb of 'new 
institutionalism' or rational actor models. Properly understood, it can help us 
understand different sets of social norms and action, and can even be invoked as 
a policy instrument to encourage specific modes of development. The term 
culture has a multiplicity of meanings. Narrowly understood, it refers to the arts 
and entertainment, whether high brow or popular. More generally, it can be 
understood as the perceptual frames, values and norms used in social life; as a 
way a society looks at itself and as a filter for what it sees. The two are 
connected, in that arts and entertainment provide symbols of identity and 
symbolic representations of social norms. Sometimes culture is expressed through 
a distinct language, which sustains its own artistic and entertainment production, 
defines the reference group as speakers of the language and disseminates values 
and norms.1 2 It is embodied in myths and icons which also sustain collective 
identity and social interaction.
11. As with all social science concepts, culture has now made a reappearance, but in rather 
crudely determinist way, or as a comprehensive explanation (as with Huntingdon's "clash of 
civilizations"). Explanation in these accounts becomes a victim of the search for parsimony.
12. Ways o f thinking can even be embedded in a language itself, as can be seen in contrasting 
French, with its facility for expressing abstract ideas, with English, which lends itself to 




























































































The relation of culture to.society, can take several forms. There may be a 
hegemonic culture, in which language, social practices and norms enforce a 
specific way of life and thinking. Quebec before the Quiet Revolution provides an 
example, with the Catholic Church and the local political class sustaining 
traditional values of piety and resisting secularization and social modernization. 
Another form of culture is social escapism, in which the symbolic representations 
of society are divorced from the reality, or culture is confined to the literary 
realm. Scotland in the late nineteenth and for much of the twentieth century 
suffered from cultural escapism. The dominant symbols of national social life 
were provided by 'tartanry', in which elements of the old Highland culture were 
stripped of their social and political significance and pressed into the service of 
the imperial state and of romantic invention, and the 'kailyard', a literary school in 
which Lowland Scotland was presented as a small town arcadia, ignoring 
industrialism, class conflicts and urban strife. A third form of culture is less 
oppressive and more adaptable. This is culture as a set of images of society, a 
way in which a society can examine itself critically, and sustain a debate on its 
past, present and future. Culture might thus be an obstacle to change and, as the 
old political development school suggested, traditional cultures might be 
incompatible with modernity. On the other hand, culture might be a factor in 
guiding the process of development, in linking the past to the present, and in 
sustaining social solidarity and a capacity for collective action in the face of 
change. Traditional elements may survive their original function to mould the 
project of modernity. Religion provides an example. Religious traditions have 
bequeathed to highly secularized societies patterns of collective action, 
corporatist accommodation and social solidarity which affect economic and social 
relations - one thinks of the Québécois model of capitalist development which 
stands out from the North American model of individualistic market capitalism 
marked by Protestant traditions of competition. Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Handers and Scotland are all marked by strong religious traditions which have 
left traces to the secularized societies of the late twentieth century. Capitalism 
since Weber, has been associated with the individualistic and acquisitive values 
of Protestantism. It may be that the new development paradigm is associated with 
other historic and contemporary traits, more rooted in collectivism and social co­
operation.
With the weakening of the institutional dominance of the nation state and 
the growing importance of collective action within civil society, culture has come 
to play a more important role in economic development. It not merely that culture 
in the broad sense conditions the form which development takes, but culture in 
the more restricted sense of the production of symbols and spectacles provides a 





























































































In one form, this simply means the commodification of culture and its sale 
in the international market place, as in the "heritage industry" which has taken 
over large parts of industrial Britain (McCrone et.al., 1995). Culture, however, is 
not merely nostalgia and can be invoked as an instrument in development and 
modernization. Culture can be a means of promoting a common identity and a 
common territorial frame of reference for individuals. This in turn can sustain 
common norms and values and facilitate social exchange. It is the common 
territorial identity which provides the link between individual and collective 
rationality, through the invocation of an 'imagined community' that, is in 
Anderson's (1983) formulation, a community of people who do not know each 
other personally or through immediate kinship, but share a common identity. A 
common territorial identity might also facilitate cross-class development 
coalitions and the search for positive-sum outcomes of class compromise, 
reconciling economic competitiveness with social solidarity. This is not to say 
that the possession of a local, regional, or minority culture is itself a guarantee of 
success in the global economy. A local culture and language may facilitate social 
production and solidarity, but also cut a territory off from participation in the 
wider market, unless it also has access to global cultures and international 
languages. The problem is the more acute since the global language required to 
participate in the international economy, English, is also the vehicle for the 
transmission of the global mass culture which threatens minority cultures. 
Another problem concerns the openness of culture. A culture rooted in ethnic 
particularism may sustain in-group solidarity, but provides a poor basis for 
territorial solidarity unless the territory is ethnically homogeneous, and since the 
new models of economic development are based on the characteristics of 
territorial economies this is what counts. Economic development also attracts 
outsiders and is associated with demographic change, so that a local culture 
which is to provide an asset for development needs to be open to incomers and 
capable of assimilating them into the local norms. Otherwise, the promotion of 
local culture may descend into xenophobia and racism, militating against social 
solidarity and co-operation and discouraging flexible adaptation.
We find often that successful territorial political movements and 
development coalitions are those that can play two contradictory themes at once. 
There is the localist theme, rooted in tradition, particularism and even isolation, 
and which threatens parochialism, xenophobia, and the crushing of local 
pluralism. There is the cosmopolitan theme, which threatens to erode social 
solidarity, attachment and culture, subordinating communities to the impersonal 
market. In some places, these two coexist in more or less uneasy partnership, 
producing a "rooted cosmopolitanism", which allows regions to operate in the 
global economy without losing their own distinct characters (Friedmann, 1991). 
In other places, the collective action problem is resolved through a culture 
characterized by what Granovetter (1973) calls weak ties, rather than the strong 




























































































action across subgroups and communities, and facilitate information transmission 
and innovation. Strong ties erect barriers, close networks and inhibit information 
flows. A culture which is based on ascriptive differentiation among subgroups 
within a territorial community is thus likely to be dysfunctional in promoting the 
type of collective action implied in the new models of innovation and economic 
development. A culture which is loose enough to encompass the entire 
population, as well as being open to outside influences and incomers, will be 
more effective for these purposes.
Little is known as yet about the way in which these local norms are 
constituted historically and sustained over time. In France, the annales school, 
and the quantitative analyses of Todd (1990), Le Bras (1995) and others have 
contributed greatly to the understanding of territorial identity and its transmission, 
but there is a lack of similar work elsewhere. Putnam's work on Italy (Putnam et. 
al., 1985; Putnam, 1993) emphasizes the importance of historical patterns and 
inheritance but proceeds to found the argument on the ahistoric concept of path- 
dependency.13 Comparative study, however, shows us that cultures and identities 
are continually been created and recreated (Rohe, 1990). Jordi Pujol, president of 
Catalonia, was never content merely to rely on the historic reality of Catalonia, 
but has preached the necessity to fer pais, to remake the country in the modem 
era, both in state institutions and in civil society. Once again, politics needs to be 
brought into the analysis, to show how culture is made, reshaped and used by 
social and political forces, establishing practices and norms and moulding the 
development agenda.
Similar remarks can be made about the more general concept of regional 
identity. Identity can be a mere cognitive category, as people recognize that the 
region exists; an affective one, as they feel positively or negatively about it; or an 
action-oriented one, a spur to mobilization (Frankberg and Schuhbauer, 1994). 
The action implied can relate to a broader or narrower social programme. In 
France, regional identity reflects on the one hand an image of the landscape, 
culture and history; and on the other a functionally-specific institution for 
planning and development (Dupoirier, 1996; Dupoirier and Roy, 1996). In 
Catalonia or Scotland, territorial identity conjures up a broader social project, and 
a locus of general political debate.
External Linkages
The new regionalism is not bounded by the nation state, but pitches regions into 
the global and European markets and into the European political space. External 
relationships, with the market and with other governments, thus become an
13. As explanation of southern underdevelopment, an event from the middle ages is selected as 
the key factor and subsequent critical historical experiences are filtered out. See Ritaine, 




























































































important element in the development project. External policy both allows regions 
to seek resources in the international environment, and facilitates the 
consolidation of the regional development coalition internally, by postulating a 
common interest in relation to the outside and projecting the region as an actor in 
the international arena. Regions' relationships with each other in the European 
market are marked by contradictory pressures to co-operation and to competition. 
They seek co-operation to mobilize resources and exploit complementarities, but 
at the same time present themselves as in a neo-mercantilist competition. There 
are three principal motives for external action (Keating, 1994; Comago, 1996): 
economic development; cultural protection; and political motives related to region 
or nation-building and the construction of a regional system of action. In 
economic matters, regional actors seek investment, markets and technology. This 
is, according to the logic of contemporary development politics, a competitive 
matter and the evidence shows that on matters strictly related to economic 
development, co-operation is very difficult to achieve. On matters of common 
interest, such as the environment, or where there are complementarities, as is 
sometimes the case in technology, co-operation is easier. There are many 
examples of cross-border co-operation, but here too it appears that the apparent 
functional advantages of co-operation and pooling resources are often 
undermined by the pressures of competition. A political will is required to 
stimulate co-operation. This is provided often by EU incentives and the 
advantages of co-operating in European institutions,14 or by over-riding political 
motivations on the part of regional leaders. Cultural motivations refer to the need 
for regions with minority cultures to seek support in the European and 
international arenas. This would explain the Catalan government's efforts to 
promote the recognition of Catalan as a recognized language in European 
institutions and a subject of instruction in universities abroad. Political 
motivations refer to the desire of regional elites to consolidate regional identity by 
projecting it abroad, to raise the status and prestige of the region and, by the same 
token, themselves, and to provide a counter-pole to the state. This is most 
important in those regions with nationalist movements, whose leaders seek to 
emphasize their national status by an active programme of para-diplomacy, but is 
also found in some other regions. Hopes that the development of a European 
political space would create new possibilities for autonomous regional action 
have been disappointed, as has the idea that regions would gradually be 
recognized as a "third level" in a European territorial hierarchy (Jeffery, 1996). 
As a result, there is a large difference in the ability of regions to operate as actors 
within Europe and a variety of strategies is adopted. Some regions, such as the 
German Lander have secured access to their national systems of policy making 
and so work through these to Europe. Others, like the Belgian regions and the 
Basque Country, have sought a more autonomous strategy, using direct links and
14. It is the existence o f these political incentives which largely explains the greater success of 




























































































individual strategies (Keating and Hooghe, 1996). Others again have been content 
to work both national and European routes, operating in as many different arenas 
as possible. This is the case with the Catalan government and would be the 
probable strategy of any future Scottish autonomous government. External 
projection of the region may be via the regional government, or through a broader 
effort, focused on functional interests or civil society. This too effects the 
structure of power within the region, since control of external linkages can be a 
power resource and help to frame the development project.
Development Strategies
What emerges from all this is a variety of development coalitions located in 
regional space, constituted of varied social interests and bound by differing value 
systems. Such an approach allows an analysis of the social interests underlying 
"networks" or systems of "governance", while also permitting a normative 
appreciation, which might consider the contribution of any set of arrangements to 
economic growth, social cohesion, equity, accountability, democratic 
participation, or cultural expression. To illustrate possible combinations, let us 
consider three ideal-types of development coalition.
Bourgeois Regionalism15 16
This is a development project, found in strong economic regions, focused a local 
business class. Emphasis is placed on economic competitiveness, productivity, 
technology and value added. Policy is legitimated by reference to market values 
and the common regional interest is invoked to overcome class oppositions. 
Business interests have the largest role in policy determination which is as far as 
possible decided in special agencies, with a large business input. Social policy is 
separated out and entrusted to governmental agencies and municipalities. There is 
a weak connection between the spheres of economic and social policy, with 
issues of distribution left to the effects of "trickle down". Employment generation 
is not seen as an end in itself, but as a by-product of growth. There is an emphasis 
on public policy initiatives and expenditures related to growth, including 
infrastructure, research, and perhaps training. External policy is functionally 
specific and geared to the needs of competitiveness.
The Sweat-Shop Economy6
In this project, the region is a policy-taker, seeking to insert itself into the global 
economy on any terms. Its competitive advantages are low wages, a minimum of 
social and environmental regulation, and a deregulated labour market. Public
15. The term comes from Harvie (1994) who uses it in a slightly different way.
16. Lest this term sound too provocatively left-wing, it should be noted that it has recently 




























































































policy initiatives are minimized and public expenditure of all sorts in kept as low 
as possible. Since wage advantages are continually being undercut by emerging 
regions elsewhere in the world, economic activities are unstable and constantly 
restructuring. Excess labour is absorbed by out-migration or by the creation of 
low-paid service employment.
The Social Democratic Project
In this project, there is a larger role for labour interests. While competitive 
development still drives the policy agenda, social considerations play a larger 
role. Distributional issues are regarded as legitimate matters of first-order politics, 
not something to be decided after growth has been achieved. Employment 
generation is a main priority in policy. Social interests are more widely 
represented, including not only labour but environmental, neighbourhood and 
other interests. Priority within economic development policy is given to those 
measures which simultaneously enhance social equality or access to employment, 
such as education and training. External policy is not emphasized, but there is 
general support for the creation of a European social space and the regulation of 
competition.
The Nation-Building Project
This is found in those regions with aspirations to national autonomy, if not 
independence, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders and, for 
opposition forces, Scotland and Wales. Here development is regarded both as 
valuable in itself and as a necessary component of nation-building and autonomy 
in the new Europe. Since nation-building is necessarily socially inclusive, this 
project must seek a broad base of support and cover a wide range of policy areas. 
The political agenda, while dominated by the preoccupation with building the 
region-nation as a system of action, is otherwise broad, since this project 
potentially includes all aspects of public life. Matters of culture and language play 
a central role and are increasingly invoked as the bases for collective action. 
Policy is legitimated by reference to the national project and territorial solidarity 
is invoked to overcome class divisions. External policy goes beyond economic 
linkages and includes cultural development and political projection. Competition 
with other regions is emphasized as a fact of life, but at the same time alliances 
are struck with other regions facing the same conditions.
Since these are ideal types, they can be combined in many ways. So 
nation-building projects may be social democratic in inspiration (as in Scotland), 
Christian democratic (as in Flanders, Catalonia and the Basque Country) or 
bourgeois (as in the failed attempt to project a "nation" of Padania).17 Social 
democratic and bourgeois projects may compete for influence, with compromises
17. The scenarios for Catalonia is outlined in de Jouvenal and Roque (1993) represent a broad 




























































































resulting. Some regions may enter into a virtuous circle, in which good public 
services, an educated labour force, and a good environment attract capital in high 
value-added sectors. Sweat-shop regions may find themselves in a vicious circle, 
in which low wages and corporate turnover reduce their tax base and deregulation 
damages their environment, forcing them into ever-lower order sectors. In other 
cases, there is no project at all, because there is no agreed territorial framework 
for action of because of the social and institutional disorganization of regional 
space. To return to the ideas I have criticized earlier in the paper, if governance is 
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